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Talent Responses to Talent Status Awareness – Not a Question of Simple Reciprocation  
 
 
ABSTRACT 
How to manage talent effectively is a key question in organizations. Yet, we still know relatively little 
about talent’s psychological reactions to their exclusive status. Based on psychological contract theory 
and research on status, this study analyzes a sample of 321 employees identified as talent by their 
organizations, only some of whom were aware of their exclusive talent status. The results provide 
evidence that talent status awareness moderates the relationship between a range of employer 
inducements and talent obligations, such that it increases the importance of some inducements while 
diminishing that of others. The study contributes to the talent management literature by isolating specific 
effects of talent status awareness and calling into question extant evidence of its direct positive effects 
on talent attitudes. The findings also have implications for talent status communication, talent 
management and future theorizing of talent reactions to their exclusive status.  
 
Keywords: Talent management, psychological contract, status, performance management. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Talent management (TM), defined as an exclusive form of workforce management (Gallardo-
Gallardo, Dries & Gonzalez-Cruz, 2013), is considered to be one of the most important human resource 
management challenges in organizations (Cappelli & Keller, 2014). Yet, while the practitioner-oriented 
literature abounds with topics related to TM, empirical academic research has only recently begun to 
gain momentum (Dries, 2013; McDonnell, Collings, Mellahi & Schuler, 2017). One strand of this 
emerging academic literature focuses on employees’ psychological reactions to TM (Dries, Forrier, Vos 
& Pepermans, 2014; Malik and Singh, 2014). We extend this research by studying how talent status 
awareness influences the way talent react to a range of management practices, or employer inducements 
as defined below . By so doing, we also create a bridge between extant research focusing on individual 
talent and research on how to manage talent (McDonnell et al., 2017).  
Research suggests that both mere belief (Björkman, Ehrnrooth, Mäkelä, Smale & Sumelius, 2013) 
and more certain knowledge (Gelens, Hofmans, Dries & Pepermans, 2014) of being identified as talent 
are associated with positive employee attitudes. Inversely, research also indicates that ambiguity (Dries 
& De Gieter, 2014) and incongruent employer-employee perceptions (Sonnenberg, Zijderveld & Brinks, 
2014) concerning talent status can be problematic. Despite this, a surprising number of organizations 
still choose not to communicate clearly to talent about their special status (Dries & De Gieter, 2014; cf. 
Silzer & Church, 2010; Björkman et al., 2013). This choice is partly due to concerns that transparency 
will increase expectations, self-satisfaction and complacency among those identified as talent (Dries & 
De Gieter, 2014; cf. Silzer & Church, 2010). Some support for this can be found in research on status 
and status dynamics (Bothner. Kim & Smith, 2012; Chen, Peterson, Phillips, Podolny & Ridgeway, 2012; 
cf. Kehoe, Lepak & Bentley, 2016), but these reactions remain understudied within TM. To address this 
important research gap and understand better the “psychological dynamics” of TM (Dries et al., 2014: 
569), we aim to answer the following research question: Do talent that are aware of their exclusive status 
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respond differently to employer inducements compared to talent that are unaware? In so doing, we also 
seek to address the important practical question of the consequences of informing talent about their status. 
In the present study we define ‘talent’ as employees whom the employer considers to be potential 
future leaders, i.e. high potentials (Gallardo-Gallardo et al., 2013; cf. Gelens et al., 2014), and status as 
“the prestige, respect, and admiration that individuals enjoy in the eyes of others” (Lount & Pettit Jr., 
2012: 15; cf. Pettit, Yong & Spataro, 2010). Conceptually, we introduce the notion of ‘talent status 
awareness’ to help us make the distinction between identified talent that are unaware of their talent status, 
and those that are actually aware of it. Empirically, we analyze a sample of 321 employees within eight 
Finnish corporations who have all been formally identified by the organization as talent. Within this 
sample, only 45% were personally aware of their talent status whereas the remaining 55% of the sample 
were unaware. This provides an ideal empirical setting for isolating and studying the moderating effects 
of talent status self-awareness.  
Theoretically, our research is primarily grounded in psychological contract theory (Coyle-Shapiro 
& Conway, 2005; Rousseau, 1995) and its central framework of employer inducements and employee 
obligations. Here, employer inducements refer broadly to various management practices or forms of 
organizational investments in employees, such as rewards, recognition and support, whereas employee 
obligations refer to employees’ commitment to reciprocate such inducements (Coyle-Shapiro & Conway, 
2005; Lee, Liu, Rousseau, Hui & Chen, 2011). Talent commitment to reciprocate organizational 
inducements is a cornerstone of TM, and thus crucial to understand, given that the primary goals of TM 
are to increase the retention and commitment of talent, and to accelerate their development (DeGieter et 
al., 2014). To connect to these goals we use a construct of obligations that focuses on talents’ 
commitment to accept dynamic performance demands and to develop their value for the organization, 
hereafter referred to as ‘talent obligations’. While psychological contract theory provides the basic 
framework within which we examine how status awareness changes the effect of organizational 
inducements on talent obligations, we also build on research into the effects of status and status dynamics 
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(Chen et al., 2012; Bothner et al., 2012; Marr & Thau, 2014). This research stream sheds light on a range 
of psychological reactions to status, status gain and status loss, that help to explain how talent status 
awareness can change the terms of the psychological contract and thereby the way in which talent react 
to organizational inducements.  
Our study contributes to the emerging literature on psychological reactions to TM (Björkman et al., 
2013; Gelens et al., 2014; Malik and Singh, 2014; Sonnenberg et al., 2014) by isolating moderating 
effects of talent status awareness among identified talent. The results call into question extant research 
on the direct motivational effects of talent status awareness and offer substantive evidence for the 
conjecture that talent attitudes may not be “only affected by the high potential label itself” but rather by 
a combination of talent status and organizational inducements (Gelens et al., 2014: 170). This extends 
extant theorizing of the effects of talent status awareness. Our results also shed further light on the 
practical consequences of transparency in communication about TM (Dries & De Gieter, 2014), 
consistent with organizational concerns about the undesirable effects of talent status awareness, such as 
increased expectations, self-satisfaction and complacency. Finally, our study brings to the fore questions 
about the relative merits of tournament-style TM (Björkman et al., 2013; cf. Bothner, Kang & Stuart, 
2007) versus the tendency for status hierarchies to ”remain stable and be self-sustaining” (Chen et al., 
2012: 302).   
 
EXTANT RESEARCH ON EMPLOYEE REACTIONS TO TALENT STATUS 
AWARENESS 
Prior research suggests that subjectively perceiving that one has been identified as talent (Björkman 
et al., 2013) and de facto being identified as talent (Gelens et al., 2014) are associated with positive 
employee attitudes. Other research points to more complex interaction effects between talent status and 
organizational inducements. First, Marescaux, De Winne and Sels (2013) show that while differentiation 
among employees tends to have positive attitudinal effects, these effects can be attenuated by perceptions 
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of negative favorability (i.e. “others unduly get more than me”), and may even turn into negative effects. 
Relatedly, while Sonnenberg et al.’s (2014) provide support for the direct influence of talent status 
perceptions on employee attitudes, their results also suggest that this influence may interact with 
employer inducements. They show that incongruence in employer-employee perceptions of talent status, 
in essence falsely believing that one has talent status, is positively correlated with psychological contract 
fulfilment, but that this association is negative when controlling for TM practices. 
On the whole extant research suggests that perceived talent status is associated with positive 
employee attitudes (cf. Cappelli & Keller, 2014; cf. McDowell et al., 2017) and that transparent 
communication is important (Sonnenberg et al., 2014). However, some of this research also suggests 
that status perceptions may influence employee reactions to organizational inducements/management 
practices in more complex ways (cf. Gelens et al., 2014).   
Given the findings pointing to the positive reactions to talent status, it appears counter-intuitive that 
“less than one in three organizations disclose information about their high potential programs to 
employees – and when they do, information is often exchanged in a very informal manner” (Dries et al., 
2014: 137; cf. Bournois and Rousillon, 1992; Dries & Pepermans, 2008; Silzer & Church, 2010). The 
degree to which employers openly communicate talent status is likely to be even lower in organizations 
from the Nordic countries due to the uneasy coexistence of strong societal values of egalitarianism and 
exclusive organizational investments in talent. For example, none of the eleven MNCs studied by 
Björkman et al. (2013) had a policy of openly communicating talent status. This wariness to 
communicate talents status supports the possibility that research is yet to uncover the complexity of the 
effects of talent status awareness. 
What may concern organizations is that letting talent know about their exclusive status may raise 
their expectations (Dries and De Gieter, 2014; Dries & Pepermans, 2008), create arrogance (Pfeffer, 
2001) and complacency – also known as the “the crown prince syndrome” (Göbel-Kobialka, 1998) – 
and even decrease their performance (Silzer & Church, 2010). Based on qualitative data, Dries and De 
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Gieter (2014) provide indicative evidence that talent status is associated with expectations of special 
treatment. Recent research on status dynamics and tournament-like forms of organization provide 
additional support for such less desirable reactions, including expectations of special treatment, self-
satisfaction, performance loss, and unhealthy competition (Chen et al., 2012; Marr & Thau, 2014).  
Even though the decision not to communicate talent status openly may be rational due to the above 
kinds of concerns, it involves what Dries and De Gieter refer to as a paradoxical ambiguity since one of 
the basic purposes of TM is to achieve “retention and commitment through differentiation” (2014: 137). 
This purpose is less likely to be achieved without communication of talent status. The above concerns 
and the fact that organizations, even in the absence of explicit communication, tend to signal information 
about talent status to their talent through different channels (Dries & De Gieter, 2014) makes it even 
more important to increase our understanding of talent reactions to status awareness.  
To contribute to this understanding, the present study focuses on the interaction effects of status 
awareness and employer inducements, effects suggested by some of the above research but hitherto 
underexplored in the TM literature.  
 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
Inducements, talent obligations and talent status awareness 
In this section we briefly explicate the theoretical foundation of our model, the related constructs we use 
and the model we test, after which we present the individual hypotheses.  
Psychological contract theory (Rousseau, 1995) focuses on the “thought processes underlying how 
employees judge their employer’s actions, how they respond to their treatment, and how they react to 
changes in their conditions of employment” (Lee et al., 2011: 202). Regarding changes or differences in 
talent’s conditions of employment, we focus on the construct of talent status awareness. In terms of 
employee reactions, we focus on talent obligations. And in terms of employer actions, or their treatment 
of employees, we focus on three types of inducements: the employer’s psychological contract fulfillment, 
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two aspects of performance management, and the provision of leadership development practices. In this 
paper, we treat the employer’s psychological contract fulfillment as an inducement in its own right based 
on the argument that it is a clear way to “signal investment in employees and recognize contributions” 
(Coyle-Shapiro and Shore, 2005, p. 776). Whilst psychological contract fulfillment may also play a 
mediating role (Lee et al., 2011), this falls outside the scope of the present study.  
The focal inducements are all likely to be of key importance in managing talent obligations: 
Psychological contract fulfilment because talent are likely to be particularly sensitive to the 
organization’s fulfilment of its part of the psychological contract (Dries & De Gieter, 2014), performance 
management because, as high performers, talent are likely to appreciate systematic performance 
management (e.g. Shaw, Dineen, Fang & Vellella, 2009), and the provision of leadership development 
practices since talent are likely to expect opportunities for development (Dries & De Gieter, 2014). What 
we do not know, and is of focal interest in the present study, is how talent status awareness influences 
talent responses to these inducements.  
In order to understand this better we complement our argumentation based on psychological contract 
theory by building on research into status and status dynamics (Chen et al., 2012). Whilst the arguments 
stemming from psychological contract theory are grounded in the norm of reciprocity (Liu et al., 2011), 
status research helps us understand the complexity of status-related effects, more specifically the 
potential for status to change the terms of reciprocity involved in the psychological contract between 
talent and the employer (cf. Dries & De Gieter, 2014). Recent research on status highlights that status 
can be both an asset and a liability (e.g. Chen et al., 2012; cf. Kehoe & Tzabbar, 2015). For example, 
status can lead directly to psychological rewards such as self-esteem (Pettit et al., 2010) and several 
other benefits (Chen et al., 2012), however it can also give rise to self-satisfaction, indifference and 
reduced agency (Bothner et al., 2007). Whether such reactions are likely consequences of subjective 
talent status awareness, and whether they are likely to influence how self-aware talent respond to the 
above mentioned employer inducements, is what we set out to examine.  
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Building on this theoretical framework, our focal argument is that the effects of employer 
inducements on talent obligations will be moderated by talent’s awareness of their exclusive status due 
to psychological reactions that are likely to arise from that awareness. Our four moderation hypotheses, 
presented below, are depicted in Figure 1.  
___________________________ 
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
___________________________ 
 
Talent status awareness, employer psychological contract fulfillment and talent obligations 
The psychological contract, from the employee viewpoint, concerns “expectations that emanate from 
perceived implicit or explicit promises by the employer” (Robinson, 1996: 575) and is defined as 
“individual beliefs, shaped by the organization, regarding terms of an exchange agreement between 
individuals and their organization” (Rousseau, 1995: 9). We know that employee perceptions of their 
employer’s psychological contract fulfillment are an important antecedent to employee obligations (Lee 
et al., 2011).  
The act of making talent aware of their status has been viewed as a “critical incident in the 
(re)formation of the exchange relationship” and the psychological contract between the talent and their 
employer (Dries & De Gieter, 2014: 139). Talent status signals the employer’s belief in the exclusive 
value of the employee, often communicated in terms of the employee’s future role and opportunities 
within the organization. The norm of reciprocity, central to psychological contract theory, implies that 
both parties of the contract continuously expect “resources in return for what they offer” (Hom, Tsui, 
Wu, Lee, Zhang, Fu & Li, 2009: 278). This tends to be especially true for high performers (Shaw et al., 
2009), which talent are likely to be. Thus, we argue that when high performing talent become aware of 
their exclusive status, and thus their exclusive value to the employer, they are likely to expect to benefit 
from it by raising their expectations regarding subsequent employer actions (Dries et al., 2014). Rather 
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than simply making talent reciprocate with positive attitudes as a form of gratitude to their talent status 
(Björkman et al., 2013; Gelens et al., 2014), we thus suggest that talent status awareness is likely to 
change the terms of the psychological contract, making talent more demanding and sensitive to the 
employer’s psychological contract fulfilment.  
The likelihood of this outcome is supported by research on status dynamics which has shown that 
an increase in status is associated with individuals’ increased self-esteem (Pettit et al., 2010) and 
confidence in their own value (Bothner et al., 2012). This should further strengthen the tendency among 
self-aware talent to increase their demands for value in return for what they offer to the employer, and 
thus increase their sensitivity concerning the degree to which the employer fulfils its part of the 
psychological contract.  
This leads us to put forth the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: Talent status awareness positively moderates the relationship between the 
employer’s psychological contract fulfillment and talent obligations such that the 
relationship is stronger for talent that are aware of their status compared to those that are 
unaware. 
 
Talent status awareness, performance management and talent obligations 
Our next two hypotheses are both related to performance appraisal. As an important performance 
management-related inducement and a central aspect of high performance work practices (Takeuchi, 
Lepak, Wang & Takeuchi, 2007; Lepak & Snell, 2002), performance appraisal serves “as the 
motivational bases for employee behavior” (Chiang & Birtch, 2010: 1367). We argue that performance 
appraisal is an important inducement in at least two specific ways. On the one hand, it serves to guide, 
support and put pressure on employees by way of target setting and the provision of evaluative feedback. 
This is an important part of the motivational aspect of performance appraisals (Rynes, Gerhart & Parks, 
2005). On the other hand, performance appraisal serves as an evaluation-based, allocative mechanism 
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to ensure appropriate rewards for performance. This connection between performance evaluation and 
rewards is important in determining employee responses (Rynes et al., 2005). Furthermore, as both play 
an important role in assuring appropriate performance-based rewards, they should be especially 
important for high performers who tend to prefer rewards for performance (Shaw et al., 2009). We can 
thus assume that both are important inducements for talent and thus positively related to their obligations. 
Based on this, we first turn to the moderated relationship between talent obligations and performance 
appraisal linked to rewards. We argue that talent status awareness is likely to strengthen this relationship 
since status awareness should increase talent’s preference for performance-based inducements and thus 
their responsiveness to them. This builds on the argumentation about an increased sensitivity to 
psychological contract fulfillment, but concerns a more specific sensitivity concerning performance-
based rewards. 
As noted, the communication of talent status can change the terms of the exchange relationship by 
making talent more self-confident (Dries & De Gieter, 2014; Silzer & Church, 2010). Research on status 
effects supports this with findings that show how status gain makes individuals more self-efficacious, 
i.e. more self-assured of their ability to perform (Bothner et al., 2012). This is partly attributable to the 
positive (self-fulfilling) effects of external social expectations faced by high-status individuals (Berger, 
Fisek, Norman &  Zelditch Jr, 1977; Webster & Entwisle, 1976; cf. Bothner et al., 2012), which forms 
the basis of the so-called Pygmalion effect (Tierney & Farmer, 2004; Whiteley, Sy & Johnson, 2012). 
Talent status clearly signals such expectations in the talent’s performance and potential (cf. Swailes & 
Blackburn, 2016). This should make self-aware talent more self-assured of their ability to perform and 
gain from performance-based rewards than unaware talent. In addition, due to their increased self-
confidence, self-aware talent are also more likely than unaware talent to view their own expected benefit 
from performance-based rewarding as an important source of reinforcement of their perceived 
exclusivity and positive distinctiveness. In addition to these status-related arguments, the importance of 
perceived reciprocity, posited by psychological contract theory to be central to how 
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“employees…respond to their treatment” (Lee et al., 2011: 202), supports the argument that 
performance-based rewards should be more highly preferred by self-aware talent and thus have a 
stronger effect on their obligations. The argument is that their increased confidence in their ability to 
deliver exclusive value to the organization should make them feel a stronger sense of entitlement to 
differentiated rewards.  
Based on both status research and psychological contract theory we thus put forth the following 
hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 2a: Talent status awareness positively moderates the relationship between 
performance appraisal that links evaluation to rewards and talent obligations such that 
the relationship is stronger for talent that are aware of their status compared to those 
that are unaware. 
 
Next, we focus on the moderated relationship between talent obligations and the inducement of 
target setting and evaluative feedback in performance appraisal. Here we extend the argument that talent 
status awareness is likely to make talent more self-confident to argue that in TM systems it is also likely 
to make them more self-satisfied, and thus less interested in and less responsive to target setting and 
evaluation in performance appraisal.  
Corporate TM systems usually involve annual talent reviews (see e.g. Gelens et al., 2014), in which 
the performance, development and future career moves of identified talent are discussed. Within a 
transparent and dynamic, tournament-style TM system (Bothner et al., 2007; cf. Bendersky & Shah, 
2012), one would expect that those identified as talent become more interested in continuous target 
setting, performance evaluation and feedback. In such TM systems, self-aware talent should be 
particularly interested in understanding what they need to do in order to comply with their part of the 
psychological contract and thus maintain their talent status. However, as noted, most employers avoid 
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transparent talent communication (Silzer & Church, 2010; Dries & De Gieter, 2014) and thus 
tournament-style talent status systems. We argue that this is likely to have profound implications for the 
attitudes of self-aware talent and the psychological contracts with their employers.  
Whilst talent status awareness is likely to make talent more confident in their ability and their value 
to the employer, the literature also suggests that it may make them complacent and even arrogant (Dries 
& De Gieter, 2014; Göbel-Kobialka, 1998; Silzer & Church, 2010; Pfeffer, 2001). Building on research 
in sociology that provides support for these status-related effects, Bothner et al. argue that “the positive 
sentiments of relative advantage” among “higher-status actors” tend not only to lead to positive effects, 
but also to negative effects in terms of indifference, reduced agency and “detrimental feelings of self-
satisfaction” (2012: 419). The TM literature also contains some indicative empirical evidence of a 
tendency among self-aware talent to become complacent and self-satisfied:  
“Once you’re on that [high potential] list, and you’re not satisfied in your job anymore 
[.. .] they’ll say “OK, let’s look at all possible positions for you here at [company], what 
would you like to do next” [. . .] I feel so comfortable in this situation” (Dries & De Gieter, 
2014: 146; italics added). 
 
The increased self-confidence and self-efficacy that tends to follow status gains (Bothner et al., 2012) 
may make self-aware talent think that they know the drill in their current job and feel relatively secure 
about their talent status. Status-related arrogance, complacency and comfortability may all follow from 
this. We argue that these reactions are especially likely to take place within a non-tournament-style TM 
system which, as noted above, is likely to be the rule rather than the exception (cf. Chen et al., 2012). 
Under these circumstances talent status awareness is likely to weaken the perceived danger of not being 
able to deliver, and thereby the need for target setting and evaluative feedback. This is likely to translate 
into a weaker effect of this type of performance management on the obligations of self-aware talent, as 
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compared to those unaware of their status, who are more eager to show they can perform. This leads us 
to hypothesize the following: 
 
Hypothesis 2b: Talent status awareness negatively moderates the relationship between 
target setting and evaluative feedback in performance appraisals and talent obligations 
such that the relationship is weaker for talent that are aware of their status compared to 
those that are unaware. 
 
Talent status awareness, leadership development practices and talent obligations 
 
Leadership development practices have been referred to as TM practices and defined as 
“communication mechanisms, ones that signal the expectations of the organization regarding the desired 
behaviors of employees, and also the organization’s reciprocal promises to these employees” 
(Sonnenberg et al., 2014: 272). Extant research indicates that talent expect and respond positively to 
inducements in the form of such practices (Dries & De Gieter, 2014; Khoreva, 2015). We go beyond 
this by arguing that talent status awareness will positively moderate the relationship between leadership 
development practices and talent obligations. 
As already discussed, becoming aware of one’s talent status is likely to shift the balance of the 
psychological contract in such a way that the self-aware talent will expect more investments in exchange 
for their acknowledged exclusive value (cf. Dries and De Gieter, 2014). Leadership development 
practices represent very concrete investments in talent and are thus especially likely to be viewed as key 
sources of balance in the psychological contract between self-aware talent and the employer. Based on 
this we argue that self-aware talent are not only likely to expect and respond positively to such practices, 
but that they will expect more of them and react more strongly to their presence /absence, than unaware 
talent.  
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From a status perspective, leadership development practices are also likely to represent visible 
affirmations of exclusive status within the organization. This is likely to become more important for self-
aware talent as their expectations of various rewards simply “by virtue of their status” is likely to be 
higher than those of unaware talent (Lount & Pettit, 2012: 17; Swailes & Blackburn, 2016). This should 
also make self-aware talent react more strongly to such practices, as compared to unaware talent. 
We note that this causal logic is quite different from the one related to target setting and evaluation 
in performance appraisal in non-dynamic TM systems. The difference is grounded in the fact that target 
setting and evaluation primarily helps talent understand how they perform and should perform in their 
current job, thus representing a form of help which is likely to become less relevant the more self-
confident, self-satisfied and complacent talent becomes. This is in contrast to leadership development 
practices, which not only represent more concrete and visible status-enhancing rewards, but also help 
talent prepare for more challenging future roles. Such preparation is likely to become more relevant and 
important for self-aware talent, almost regardless of their confidence, since they are more likely than 
unaware talent to expect such future challenges.  
Based on this we put forward our final hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3: Talent status awareness positively moderates the relationship between 
leadership development practices and talent obligations such that the relationship is 
stronger for talent that are aware of their status compared to those that are unaware. 
 
METHOD 
Sample 
The data were collected in 2012 through a web-based survey by an executive education unit at a leading 
Nordic business school based on a questionnaire developed by the authors. 76 Finnish companies, among 
those 11 that had participated in an earlier collaboration on leadership development with the education 
unit, were contacted for the present talent survey. This resulted in eight companies participating, their 
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size varying between of 1.1 – 9.7 billion EUR in turnover. The companies represented five different 
industries, industrial machinery and services, pharmaceutical wholesale, banking, media and IT services. 
The survey was sent out to 589 talent, in this case employees who had been formally identified by the 
organizations as high-potentials for top management/management team positions by 2020. The sampled 
individuals thus represent talent defined as high-potentials (Gelens et al., 2014; cf. Malik & Singh, 2014). 
Anonymity was guaranteed to the respondents in order to minimize social desirability bias. 321 useful 
responses were received, the effective response rate of the surveyed talent thus being 55%. None of the 
organizations had an explicit organizational policy of openly communicating talent status. As a result, 
only 45% (N=144) of the identified talent were aware of their status as high potentials. Sample 
demographics are presented in Table 1. 
 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
Measures 
 
Dependent variable  
Talent obligations was measured with six items based on Rousseau (2000). The construct captures 
talents’ commitment to accept dynamic performance demands and to develop their value for the 
organization. We first  asked the talent to rate their commitment i) to accept increasingly challenging 
performance requirements; ii) to accept new and different performance requirements iii) to adjust to 
changing performance demands. We also asked them to rate their commitment i) to seek out 
developmental opportunities that enhance your value to your employer; ii) to build skills to increase 
your value to your employer; iii) to make yourself increasingly valuable to your employer. These 
measures are closely related to the key goal of TM to “accelerate the development of employees 
with high potential” (Dries & De Gieter, 2014: 139) and form two key employee obligations 
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dimensions of the “balanced” psychological contract (Rousseau, 2000: 4, 9-10). The operationalization 
of each dimension was based on the three first mentioned, well-functioning items in the final 
recommendations in the Appendix in Rousseau (2000). The Cronbach’s alpha for the full six-item 
(seven-point Likert scale) construct was 0.89.  
 
Independent variables  
Psychological contract fulfillment was measured with three items based on Robinson and 
Morrison (2000). We asked the talent to rate, on a seven-point Likert scale, their experience concerning 
the following: i) All the promises made by my employer during recruitment have been kept so far, ii) I 
feel that my employer has fulfilled the promises communicated to me, iii) So far my employer has done 
an excellent job of fulfilling its promises to me. The alpha value for this construct was 0.95. 
Connection between performance appraisal and rewards was operationalized by two items 
tapping into the respondent’s experience as follows: i) Performance appraisals are used for reward 
decisions; ii) Performance appraisals are used for promotion decisions. The Cronbach’s alpha was 0.73. 
The items were developed by the current authors to capture the link between performance appraisal and 
its consequences for rewards. It focuses on an aspect of performance appraisal that has gone largely 
unnoticed in extant research, answering to the call for more research on the effects of “linking PE 
[performance evaluation] to pay or other rewards” (Ryan et al., 2005:573).  
Target setting and evaluative feedback in performance appraisal was operationalized by four 
items tapping into the respondent’s experience: i) Performance appraisals are used for setting 
performance targets; ii) Performance appraisals are used to provide feedback on performance; iii) 
Performance appraisals are used for determining development needs; iv) Performance appraisals are 
used to provide feedback on development. The Cronbach’s alpha was 0.87. The items were adapted based 
on measures of performance appraisal as part of high-performance work practices (Takeuchi et al., 2007; 
Lepak & Snell, 2002) and the key elements of motivational performance appraisals (Rynes et al., 2005).  
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Leadership development practices was measured by 16 items that MNCs typically use for 
leadership development (see e.g. Evans, Pucik and Björkman, 2010). The construct captured practices 
related to five dimensions: mobility, short-term assignments, special projects, feedback, coaching and 
mentoring, and formal training programs. Sample items are: Moving to new positions (for at least one 
year) in other division/business unit (Mobility); Implementing reorganizations (Special projects). 
Overall, it compares well to the construct of TM practices used by Sonnenberg et al. (2014) and the 
practices implemented in the organization studied by Gelens et al. (2014). We carried out an initial 
validation of our 16-item construct by performing confirmatory factor analyses (CFAs) with Mplus 
(Muthén & Muthén, 1998-2007). We first specified a model with the expected five first-order 
dimensions. This first-order model did not satisfactorily fit the data based on Williams, Vandenberg, and 
Edwards (2009). Informed by this model we excluded the three items measuring the dimension ’Short-
term assignments’ which were not distinct enough from the items measuring the dimension ’Mobility’, 
yet not similar enough to load on the same dimension. The resulting four-dimensional 13-item 
measurement model of leadership development practices exhibited good fit (𝜒𝜒2(59) = 128.663, p = 
0.000; CFI = 0.933; RMSEA = 0.066; SRMR = 0.050). Below, we offer further validation of the 
convergent and discriminant validity of this construct, including a second-order factor model. The 
Cronbach’s alpha for the full original scale was .89 and for the reduced 13-item scale .87. The full 
measurement instrument can be obtained from the authors. 
 
Moderator 
Talent status awareness was measured by the question ‘Are you formally identified by your 
corporation as belonging to a talent pool/group of high potentials or similar?’ This variable thus captures 
respondents’ subjective beliefs about having been identified as talent by the organization. Identified 
talent may be aware of their status in one way, i.e. by correctly perceiving that they have talent status. 
However, they may be unaware in two different ways – either by incorrectly perceiving they do not 
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have talent status or simply by not knowing whether they have that status or not. In operationalizing 
talent status awareness we therefore used the response categories of ‘Yes’, ‘No’, and ‘Don’t know’. 
Since the number of talent in the ‘No’ category was low (11% of the sample), and did not show any 
differences in reactions compared to the ‘Don’t know’ category, we merged the two into one category 
of unaware talent. Talent status awareness was thus operationalized as a dichotomous variable (Aware 
= 1; Unaware = 0).   
 
Control variables 
In addition to using the MNC as a blocking variable in the analysis (see below), we controlled for 
respondent gender, age, tenure and nationality. Gender was measured as 1= Male, 0 = Female. Age was 
measured with the following categories, 1 = less than 30 years, 2 = 31-35 years, 3 = 36-40 years, 4 = 41-
45, 5 = 46-50 and 6 = over 51 years. Tenure in corporation was measured with the following categories: 
1 = 0-6 months, 2 = 7-12 months, 3 =1-2 years, 4 =3-5 years, 5 = 6-10 years, 6 = over 10 years. The 
nationality of the respondent was measured by assigning a dummy variable for each nationality. Groups 
are used for age and tenure. All control variables are thus categorical factors.  
Descriptive statistics are exhibited in Table 2. It shows that all bivariate correlations between the 
independent and the dependent variables are significant and in the expected directions, suggesting that 
all variables are important for talent. 
 
- INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE - 
 
ANALYSES 
 
Validation  
To analyze the validity of all our key constructs we performed a CFA with Mplus (Muthén & Muthén, 
1998-2007). We thus specified a model with the expected three unidimensional first-order constructs 
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(Psychological contract fulfillment; Performance appraisal - target setting and evaluative feedback; 
Performance appraisal - connection to rewards) together with the two multidimensional second-order 
constructs (Talent obligations with two first-order dimensions; Leadership development practices with 
four first order dimensions). Based on the criteria specified by Williams et al. (2009) this complex CFA 
exhibited good fit with the data (𝜒𝜒2(335) = 688.721, p = 0.000; CFI = 0.931; RMSEA = 0.057; SRMR 
= 0.057) and thus offered strong evidence of discriminant and convergent validity of our constructs, 
including further support for the reliability of the measures. 
The ICC values for the organizational level were between .05 - .06 (ICC1) and .69 - .75 (ICC2). 
Based on LeBreton and Senter (2008) these values, in particular ICC1, make it relevant to account for 
the organizational-level nestedness of our data. Therefore, we conducted the regression analyses using 
Linear Mixed Modeling in SPSS with the organization (N= 8) as a blocking variable. 1  
 
RESULTS 
 
Model 1 (Table 3) shows that the random intercept is significant, showing the appropriateness of 
using the organization as a blocking variable to exclude between-organization variance in our individual-
level analyses. When we include the controls and all independent variables in Model 2, none of the 
control variables are significant, and neither is ‘talent status awareness’. This model offers support for 
the importance of our inquiry in suggesting that status awareness alone cannot explain talent obligations, 
despite the fact that self-aware talent tend to express higher obligations (Table 2). Model 3 offers support 
for three (H1, H2b, H3) of our four hypotheses about the moderation effects of talent status awareness. 
 
- INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE - 
 
                                                          
1 Although no data were aggregated, upon a reviewer request we calculated rWG values. They varied between .55 and .81 
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In Hypothesis 1 we proposed a moderating effect of talent status awareness on the relationship 
between the employer‘s fulfillment of their part of the psychological contract and talent obligations,. 
The significant and positive interaction of talent status awareness and psychological contract fulfillment 
in Model 3 (std. β = 0.15, p ≤ 0.05) provides support for this hypothesis. Controlling for all other 
independent variables and interactions, Figure 2 shows that the relationship between psychological 
contract fulfillment and talent obligations is indeed more strongly positive for self-aware talent as 
compared to talent who are unaware of their status.  
Hypothesis 2a proposed that talent status awareness would also positively moderate the 
relationship between talent obligations and performance appraisals linked to rewards. Model 3 shows no 
support for this (std. β = 0.00, p > 0.05).  
Hypothesis 2b, which proposed that the relationship between talent obligations and target setting 
and evaluation in performance appraisal will be weaker for self-aware talent compared to unaware talent 
was supported in Model 3 (std. β = - 0.22, p ≤ 0.05). Figure 3 illustrates this and shows that there is a 
much stronger positive association among talent who are unaware of their exclusive status compared to 
self-aware talent. 
 
- INSERT FIGURES 2, 3 & 4 ABOUT HERE - 
 
Hypothesis 3, predicting a positive moderation effect of talent status awareness on the relationship 
between leadership development practices and talent obligations was supported in Model 3 (std. β = 
0.20, p ≤ 0.05). Figure 4 illustrates this moderation showing that for self-aware talent the relationship 
between leadership development practices and talent obligations is more strongly positive than for 
unaware talent.  
Finally, to enhance the interpretation of the slopes shown in Figures 2-4, we compared each of 
the six slopes to zero based on the procedures described by Cohen, Cohen, West and Aiken 
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(2003). The results (Table 4) show that the slopes for the relationships between Psychological 
contract fulfilment and Talent obligations (in Figure 2) and, respectively, Leadership 
development practices and Talent obligations (in Figure 4), were significantly different from 
zero only for Aware Talent. In contrast, the relationship between Target setting and evaluation in 
Performance appraisal and Talent obligations (in Figure 3) was significantly different from zero 
only for Unaware Talent.  
 
- INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE - 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper, we sought to answer the research question “Do talent who are aware of their exclusive 
status respond differently to employer inducements compared to unaware talent?”. Whereas previous 
research has indicated that subjective and objective talent status has positive direct effects on employee 
attitudes (Björkman et al., 2013; Gelens et al., 2014; for an exception see Dries et al, 2014), our results 
paint a more complex picture. It suggests that, rather than having a direct effect on obligations, status 
awareness influences how talent respond to organizational inducements, thus changing the effect of the 
latter on obligations. This has important implications for the theorization of the effects of talent status 
awareness, the communication of talent status and the management of talent.  
First, our finding that self-aware talent, as compared to unaware talent, respond more strongly to 
both psychological contract fulfilment and leadership development practices indicates that talent status 
awareness makes talent considerably more sensitive to what companies offer them in return for their 
acknowledged value. Both of these results extend earlier findings that talent expect employer 
investments in their future career (Dries & De Gieter, 2014) by suggesting that the act of informing 
talent about their status, in itself, is likely to raise talents expectations concerning their employment 
relationship. 
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With respect to performance management, our study suggests that talent status awareness makes the 
use of target setting and provision of evaluative feedback a significantly less effective management tool 
for nurturing talent obligations. We explain this by the fact that when talent become aware of their 
exclusive status they are not only likely to become more self-assured, self-efficacious and self-directed, 
but also more self-satisfied, perhaps even arrogant and complacent (Bothner et al., 2012; cf. Pfeffer, 
2001). We argue that these challenges in managing self-aware talent’s performance are more likely to 
occur within static, non-tournament-style TM systems (which are more commonplace) than tournament-
like ones where talent status can change year on year. However, the latter systems may have their own 
challenges as discussed below.  
Contrary to our expectations, we found no moderation effect of talent status awareness on the 
relationship between talent obligations and performance appraisal linked to rewards; in other words, 
self-aware talent are no more responsive in this regard than unaware talent. A possible explanation is 
that self-aware talent may on average, be more prone to worry about not being able to keep up their level 
of performance, even as the status awareness also tends to make them more confident. Some support for 
this conjectured attenuating effect is provided by findings that high status ultimately tends to be 
associated with weakening performance over time (Bothner et al., 2012) and that status loss, and even 
the fear of status loss (cf. Pettit et al., 2010), can be detrimental to employees’ performance (Marr & 
Thau, 2014).  
In sum, our results contribute to research on TM in two important ways. First, in contrast to much 
extant research (Björkman et al., 2013; Gelens et al., 2014; Sonnenberg et al., 2014), our study strongly 
suggests that we need to account for a combination of status awareness and organizational inducements 
in order to properly understand the effects of status awareness on talent attitudes such as their obligations 
towards the employer. This provides substantive support for the conjecture that talent attitudes may not 
be “only affected by the high potential label itself, but also by the amount and type of resources that 
follow” (Gelens et al., 2014: 170). It thus suggests that theorizing the specific effects of talent reactions 
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to their talent status based on direct reciprocation (Björkman et al., 2013; Gelens et al., 2014; cf. Swailes 
& Blackburn, 2016) is not sufficient. Second, we show that talent status awareness among talent is 
associated with a differential sensitivity to a set of specific employer inducements, consistent with a 
range of psychological reactions among self-aware talent, both in the form of increased confidence and 
expectations as well as self-satisfaction and complacency. In this way the study also helps us understand 
the fears among employers that self-aware talent may become arrogant and complacent (Göbel-Kobialka, 
1998; cf. Dries & De Gieter, 2014). 
 
Practical implications 
The present study calls into question recent evidence that talent status awareness is straightforwardly 
positively related to talent attitudes (Björkman et al., 2013; Cappelli & Keller, 2014; McDonnell et al., 
2017) and thereby calls into question any clear recommendation that talent status should be 
communicated, even to talent only. Our study also deepens our understanding of how delicate an issue 
TM is. On the one hand, non-transparent communication of talent status has its disadvantages, 
potentially increasing talent turnover (Dries and De Gieter, 2014; cf. Björkman et al., 2013) and 
negatively influencing psychological contract fulfillment by creating incongruent perceptions of talent 
status (Sonnenberg et al., 2014). On the other hand, our findings suggest that if employers communicate 
talent status to their identified talent, then they also need to deal with the increased expectations 
concerning organizational inducements such as psychological contract fulfilment and leadership 
development opportunities. Otherwise they risk losing the commitment-effects of the communication. 
In addition, the employer may need to carefully deal with increased challenges to manage the 
performance of self-aware talent given their arguable tendency to become more self-confident, possibly 
even self-satisfied and arrogant (c.f. Göbel-Kobialka, 1998; cf. Dries & De Gieter, 2014). Overall this 
study provides some first-hand evidence concerning the key question of what organizations 
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implementing TM need to face up to, and do, to "maximise the contributions" of their talent (McDonnell 
et al., 2017: 116) given that they tend to become aware of their status. 
It is important to note, however, that the above effects of talent status awareness are logically likely 
to vary between individuals and depend both on the type of TM system employers implement and on 
how talent status is communicated to employees. For example, in some contexts and among some 
individuals the reactions may be quite different to those examined in the present study (Petriglieri & 
Petriglieri, 2017).  We also note that the explained variance and differences in effect size in the present 
study are limited, albeit clearly significant and fully comparable to moderation research on other topics. 
While more research is needed to better understand both the contextual dependence and practical 
significance of our specific results, what stands more firmly is our calling into question the 
straightforwardly positive effects of talent status awareness and transparent talent communication.   
 
Limitations and future research 
Our study involves a number of limitations. First, we should urge caution in drawing causal 
conclusions based on our cross-sectional study. Second, we cannot entirely exclude effects of common 
method bias, although such bias cannot explain the significant moderations that we found (Siemsen, 
Roth & Oliveira, 2010). Third, job-related differences, supervisor-related differences, or individual 
differences beyond our control variables may have influenced our interactions. For example, in line with 
previous research we studied talent based on unknown organizational criteria of high potentials. This 
may hide substantive variation in the talent and their attitudes and sensitivities. Based on larger samples 
future research may also find differences between talent that actively believe they are not identified and 
talent that are unsure of their identification. Fourth, evident heterogeneity bias may have resulted from 
the fact that we did not have detailed data on financial reward packages or promotions. Fifth, although 
our sample included several talent nationalities it was limited to talent working for Finnish companies. 
This Nordic cultural setting may have influenced the results, perhaps mainly by an increased prevalence 
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of non-tournament-style TM systems and a higher degree to which open talent communication is avoided. 
However, given that neither of these phenomena is uncommon in other cultures, we see no obvious 
reason to suspect that our findings would be culturally biased. Finally, in this study we did not have 
adequate data either on the ways in which the employers may implicitly or explicitly have communicated 
talent status, nor on the type of TM system they implemented. In our view, these last two limitations 
provide particularly important areas of future research. 
Unfavorable psychological reactions to talent status awareness, such as increased expectations and 
self-satisfaction may be attenuated, or entirely avoided, if an organization implements a tournament-
style TM system in combination with clearly communicating talent status to both talent and non-talent. 
To shed more light on the effects of such TM systems, research on status and status dynamics can enrich 
future research beyond what we have built on in the present study. This research stream has identified 
complex, tournament-related dynamic effects of having status (Bothner et al., 2012), of competing for 
status (e.g. Bothner et al., 2007; cf. Bothner, Podolny and Smith, 2011), of gaining status (Bendersky 
and Shah, 2012) and of losing status (Marr & Thau, 2014). Similar mechanisms are also likely to be 
present in the domain of TM. Status research has also recently been used to shed light on the complexity 
(Kehoe et al., 2016) and duality (Kehoe & Tzabbar, 2015) of the effects of star performers on the rest of 
the organization. Extant status research thus provides interesting and important avenues for future 
research both on the psychological reactions to TM and its impact beyond such reactions.  
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TABLE 1 
Sample demographics 
 
 Talent Status Awareness 
 Aware  Unaware 
Gender    
   Male (%) 108 (73.0)  132 (72.1) 
   Female (%) 40 (27.0)  49 (26.8) 
Age    
   < 30 (%) 17 (11.5)  22 (12.0) 
   31-35 (%) 40 (27.0)  47 (25.7) 
   36-40 (%) 46 (31.1)  42 (23.0) 
   41-45 (%) 21 (14.2)  43 (23.5) 
   46-50 (%) 14 (9.5)  17 (9.3) 
   51- (%) 9 (6.1)  12 (6.6) 
Tenure Corporation    
   0-6 months (%) 1 (0.7)  4 (2.2) 
   7-12 months (%) 2 (1.4)  10 (5.5) 
   1-2 years (%) 22 (14.9)  28 (15.3) 
   3-5 years (%) 46 (31.1)  63 (34.4) 
   6-10 years (%) 40 (27.0)  37 (20.2) 
   11+ years (%) 36 (24.3)  40 (21.9) 
Organisation    
   1 (%) 23 (15.5)  16 (8.7) 
   2 (%) 9 (6.4)  5 (2.7) 
   3 (%) 16 (10.8)  0 (0.0) 
   4 (%) 18 (12.2)  22 (12.0) 
   5 (%) 9 (6.1)  32 (17.5) 
   6 (%) 21 (14.2)  33 (18.0) 
   7 (%) 31 (20.9)  35 (19.1) 
   8 (%) 19 (12.8)  40 (21.9) 
    
Total N (complete responses) (%)1 144 (44.8)  177 (55.2) 
    
Nationality    
   Number of different nationalities 26  30 
 
1Total responses was 332 but one respondent did not report status awareness. Other missing 
values explain the differences between complete N and N within the various categories. 
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TABLE 2 
Means, standard deviations and correlations 
 
 
   
Variable 
Mean 
(median) 
S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6  
1. Talent Obligations 5.62 .84        
2. Psychological contract fulfilment 4.83 1.37 .13**       
3. Connection between performance 
appraisal and rewards 
4.16 1.40 .17** .29**      
4. Target setting and evaluative 
feedback in performance appraisal 
5.09 1.21 .15** .23** .69**     
5. Leadership development practices 3.33 0.96 .13** .32** .32** .20**    
6. Talent status awareness -1  .19** .10* .14* .13** .19**   
7. Age 
(36-40 
years) 
-2 -.01 .01 .08 .11* .15** .06  
8. Tenure Corporation 
(4-10 
years) 
-2 -.10* .01 -.04 -.01 .03 .10   
 
*   Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
1 Mean (median) not meaningful as the Talent Status Awareness is a dichotomous variable. 
2 Standard deviation not meaningful as Age and Tenure are factorial variables. 
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TABLE 3 
Linear Mixed Model regressions 
 
 Dependent variable:  
Talent obligations 
Model 11  Model 2  Model 3 
 β p-value  β p-value  β p-value 
Intercept:  Organization (N=8) as blocking 
variable1                               5.665 .000*** 
 
5.042 .000*** 
 
5.023 .000*** 
Individual-level controls (factors)2     
 
    
 
    
Age        .823    .804 
Nationality3        .203    .130 
Gender        .309    .520 
Tenure corporation        .372    .305 
Independent variables (covariates)     
 
    
 
    
Psychological contract fulfilment     
 
.03 .418 
 
-.03 .467 
Connection between performance appraisal 
and rewards     
 
.09 .016* 
 
.11 .018* 
Target setting and evaluative feedback in 
performance appraisal     
 
.09 .050* 
 
.17 .005** 
Leadership development practices      .09 .050*  -.00 .941 
Talent status awareness (dummy)      .16 .076  -.14 .758 
Moderations     
 
    
 
    
Talent status awareness * Psychological 
contract fulfilment     
 
    
 
.15 .036* 
Talent status awareness * Connection 
between performance appraisal and 
extrinsic rewards     
 
    
 
.00 .981 
Talent status awareness * Target setting 
and evaluative feedback in performance 
appraisal     
 
    
 
-.22 .023* 
Talent status awareness * Leadership 
development practices     
 
    
 
.20 .032* 
                
-2LL 824.1  704.2  690.7 
△-2LL 4.3*  3.1#  4.6* 
Pseudo R2 (indexed relative to model 0)   0,28  0,33 
N 321  321  321 
df 3  53  57 
         
Two-sided test:  * p ≤ 0.05;     ** p ≤ 0.01;     *** p ≤ 0.001 
  
 
1Model 1 includes a random intercept (for level-2). Model 1 is compared against a model (not shown) with only a fixed 
intercept => It shows a significant difference between level-2 units (organizations).   
 
2As the control variables are all categorical they do not have only one β-coefficient, but a set of coefficients for each 
dummy. These are not reported. The p-values correspond to Type III test of fixed effects for each variable. 
 
3As the number of dummies for respondent nationalities was high compared to the sample size we also ran 
the models without these dummies. This did not change the results 
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TABLE 4  
Tests of Simple Slopes of interaction effects  
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
β 
t-value 
of slope 
p-value 
of slope 
        
Aware Talent, Psychological contract fulfillment .12 2.191 .029* 
Unaware Talent, Psychological contract fulfillment -.03 -.671 ins. 
        
Aware Talent, Target setting and evaluative feedback in performance appraisal -.05 -.913 ins. 
Unaware Talent, Target setting and evaluative feedback in performance appraisal  .17 3.104 .002** 
        
Aware Talent, Leadership development practices .20 3.162 .002** 
Unaware Talent, Leadership development practices .00 .000 ins. 
        
Two-sided test:  * p ≤ 0.05;     ** p ≤ 0.01       
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FIGURE 1  
The conceptual model 
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FIGURE 2  
Moderation effect of talent status awareness and psychological contract fulfillment 
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FIGURE 3  
Moderation effect of talent status awareness and target setting and evaluative feedback in 
performance appraisal 
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FIGURE 4  
Moderation effect of talent status awareness and leadership development practices 
 
 
 
 
